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With recent advancements in the field of artificial intelligence, deep learning has created a niche in 
the technology space and is being actively used in autonomous and IoT systems globally. 
Unfortunately, these deep learning models have become susceptible to adversarial attacks which can 
severely impact their integrity. Research has shown that many state-of-the-art models are vulnerable 
to attacks by well-crafted adversarial examples. These adversarial examples are perturbed versions of 
clean data which have small amount of noise added to them. These adversarial samples are 
imperceptible to the human eye but can easily fool the targeted model. The exposed vulnerabilities of 
these models raise the question of their usability in safety-critical real-world applications such as 
autonomous driving and applications in the field of medicine. In this work, I have documented the 
effectiveness of six different gradient based adversarial attacks on ResNet image recognition model. 
Defending against these adversaries is a difficult problem and adversarial retraining has been one of 
the widely used defense technique. Adversarial retraining aims at training a more robust model that is 
capable of handling the adversarial examples attack proactively. I demonstrate the limitations of the 
traditional adversarial retraining technique which is effective against some adversaries but fails 
against more sophisticated attacks. I present a new ensemble defense strategy using adversarial 
retraining technique which is capable of withstanding six adversarial attacks on cifar10 dataset with 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Global research in academia and industry has promoted the adoption of deep learning applications 
in every aspect of life. From smart home devices like Amazon echo, Google Home and Facebook 
portal to industrial applications like deliveries by drone, warehouse automation, medical imaging and 
self-driving vehicles. The inception of these devices in both personal and industrial setting has been 
accelerated by the advancements in the field of deep learning. Transforming perception into smart 
responses/action in real time is possible only due to faster and more accurate image recognition 
models. For instance, smartphones use face detection and recognition to authenticate the correct user. 
Tesla uses deep learning to design self-driving features such as object detection, semantic 
segmentation, lane detection, pedestrian detection, traffic sign recognition, etc., to help it make smart 
decisions in real-time situations. Smart surveillance security cameras are equipped with face and 
activity recognition which identify and record any abnormal activity or entry. 
However, with the wide-scale adoption of IoT devices, the systems are exposed to a multitude of 
vulnerabilities. One such vulnerability is adversarial examples. These adversarial examples are 
carefully crafted inputs, aimed at fooling the model and bringing down the model’s accuracy and 
real-world performance. These attacks are not easy to detect as they are usually imperceptible to 
humans, yet they can easily degrade the model’s accuracy. The adversaries are asymmetric in nature 
and are created in specific ways to compromise the integrity of deep learning models. These have 
posed major risks in implementing deep learning in safety-critical applications, such as home 
security, medical imaging, and autonomous vehicles.  
In this work, I use multiple gradient-based attacks to showcase their effectiveness against the 
target model. Defense against these attacks has been a well-researched topic and previous work on 
the topic of adversarial retraining shows its effectiveness against different gradient based attacks 
[12]. The proposed approach does add some robustness to the model, yet, the decrease in accuracy is 




application of these models in safety-critical environments. I have explored the same idea of 
adversarial retraining to build more resilient models that can withstand adversarial attacks with high 
confidence. The main contribution of this work is as follows: 
• I provided experimental results of six different gradient-based adversarial attacks, 
including FGSM, BIM, ILLC, DeepFool, Carlini-Wagner L2 and L∞, on ResNet34 model 
using cifar10 dataset. 
• In order to defend the target model against the attacks, I demonstrate that the previously 
proposed adversarial retraining technique, [10], has limited effectiveness and does not 
provide transferable security against more sophisticated attacks. 
• I proposed that adversarial retraining technique coupled with our ensemble method is 
capable of withstanding even sophisticated attacks like Carlini-Wagner attacks [4], 
achieving model accuracy with minimum of 89.31%, and up to 96.24% for DeepFool 
attack. 
The rest of the work is structured as follows: In Section II, I discuss in brief about the background 
of our topic and some previous related work. Next, in Section III, I review the set of six gradient-
based attacks used for our experiment. Section IV describes the details of our defense architecture 
which encompasses the adversarial retraining technique coupled with the ensemble approach to 
perform classification. Finally, Section V describes the experimentation results which is followed by 





Figure 1: Clean (left) vs adversarial (right) images generated using CWL2 attack




CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 
Though adversarial attacks have been common for a couple of decades, their applications were 
limited to conventional machine learning methods. For example, variable length of extra padding bits 
at the end of malware to mask its signature [1], defeating spam filters by appending additional text at 
end of spam messages are few of the many adversarial attacks which were used against machine 
learning methods [2].   
The idea of adversarial examples attacks which work as a game between an adversary and a 
machine learning model was first proposed back in 2004 [5]. The approach for attack and defense of 
the adversarial samples was to play an iterative game which prepared the adversarial examples in an 
incremental manner. The gradient-based approach was used for the first time to construct adversarial 
samples back in 2010 [2]. They experimented with multiple models ranging from linear regression, 
SVM to neural networks. Existence of such adversarial examples for neural networks was shown for 
the first time back in 2014, where Szegedy researched over the peculiar behavior of neural networks 
on exposure to such attacks [18]. 
To counter these adversaries, several defense techniques have been researched upon so far. 
Adversarial retraining and defensive distillation are some of the widely researched topics. 
Adversarial retraining involves retraining the target model with adversaries to make it robust against 
adversarial examples [6, 7, 10]. Defensive distillation works on the idea of a teacher and a student 
model where soft predictions from the teacher model are used along with the input for making 
predictions from the student model [16]. However, all proposed defenses have some limitations and 





CHAPTER 3. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES GENERATION   
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Figure 2: The adversarial examples generation process 
The general concept of adversarial examples, in the context of deep learning, can be represented in 
form of an optimization problem where the aim is to minimize the objective function that constructs the 
adversarial examples while keeping it as close as possible to a genuine input. This adversarial example 
is almost imperceptible to the human eye but can fool the deep learning model. This concept can be 
summarized in the form of the following equation: 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 ∶  𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) → 𝑦𝑦 
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺, 𝑥𝑥 ∈ [0,1]𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝐺𝐺 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,  
𝑦𝑦 ∈ {𝑦𝑦1,𝑦𝑦2,𝑦𝑦3, … ,𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘} 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝐺𝐺 𝑘𝑘 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺 𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 
𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� = 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 
𝑒𝑒 = ��𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗’��     𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜ℎ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 0 < 𝑒𝑒 <  𝜖𝜖  𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′ ∈ [0,1] 
𝑂𝑂𝑙𝑙𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝐺𝐺 |𝑒𝑒| 
∴ 𝑓𝑓�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′� = 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗′ 𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗′ 
Considering an example of image classification where the images are made up of normalized 𝑥𝑥 





network which correctly classifies a sample input image 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 as 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 category. The objective is to create a 
new input 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ’ which is like 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗. Distance measure can be used to quantify the closeness of the two 
images which is denoted by 𝑒𝑒. The new image 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ’ is constructed by solving the optimization problem 
of finding out the minimum value of 𝑒𝑒 which is lower bounded by 0 and upper bounded by a constant 
𝜖𝜖. This 𝜖𝜖 controls the overall structural and geometric composition of the synthetic image. A 
successfully constructed 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ’  should be able to produce an output of 𝑓𝑓�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′� as  𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗′ which is not the 
correct result. For a human, the adversarial sample 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′ is still like the original sample 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗. Hence a 
robust neural network should also classify it as 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗, but it fails in doing so [14]. This describes a 
successful creation of an adversarial example and a demonstration of how a simple attack can look like 
in real world.  
The architecture for generating such adversarial examples is shown in Figure 2. For our experiment, 
I selected six different gradient-based attack algorithms briefly described as follows: 
3.1 Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) 
 
For many problems, the precision of an individual input feature is limited. Due to this, a classifier 
can classify an input x and its adversarial example 𝑥𝑥� = 𝑥𝑥 + 𝜂𝜂 to the same class if 𝜂𝜂 is smaller than the 
precision of the features. Let us consider the following for weight w and the adversarial example 𝑥𝑥� : 
 𝑤𝑤𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥� = 𝑤𝑤𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 + 𝑤𝑤𝑇𝑇𝜂𝜂 (1) 
The adversarial perturbation in equation 1 makes the activation grow by 𝑤𝑤𝑇𝑇𝜂𝜂. The maximum value 
of perturbation (|| 𝜂𝜂 ||∞) does not change with the increase in the number of dimensions. But, if the 
weight vector w has n dimensions and the average magnitude of the weight vector is m, then the 
activation will grow linearly with 𝜖𝜖𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜.  For higher dimensions, an infinitesimal number of small 
changes can be made to the input that results in one large change to the output. This has been called 
“accidental steganography” and it is a linear and faster way to create adversarial examples. 




hypothesize that it is easy to create adversarial examples for inputs with high dimensions. They also 
hypothesize that neural networks use linear techniques for faster optimization and hence are prone to 
linear adversarial attacks.  
 𝜂𝜂 = 𝜖𝜖 ∗ 𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺�∇x   𝐽𝐽(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)� (2) 
Here, 𝜃𝜃 is the parameter of the model, x is the normal input to the model, y is the target output for the 
input, and 𝐽𝐽(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) is the cost function for the model. The gradient of the cost function ∇𝑥𝑥   with 
respect to the input is calculated. 𝜖𝜖 is used to control the amplitude of the perturbation. 
3.2 Basic Iterative Method (BIM) 
 
Extending the logic of FGSM, [9] demonstrated with the use of a smartphone how adversarial 
examples can fool a deep learning model in real life example. They proposed the algorithm BIM that 
created samples in an iterative manner with small step size. The algorithm clipped the pixel values of 
intermediate results whenever the values exceeded the maximum perturbation threshold of ϵ. 
𝑥𝑥0𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑥𝑥,    
𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛+1𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥,𝜖𝜖{𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  + 𝛼𝛼 𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺(𝛻𝛻𝑥𝑥   𝐽𝐽(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡))} 
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺, 𝑥𝑥: 𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
              𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎:𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺 
              𝛼𝛼: 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝐺𝐺 
 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥,𝜖𝜖:𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 > 𝜖𝜖, 𝑖𝑖. 𝑡𝑡.  𝜖𝜖 > 0 
The final adversarial examples were generated after multiple iterations of the algorithm. 
3.3 Iterative Least-Likely Class Method (ILLC) 
 
Along with BIM, [9] also proposed an algorithm to attack the model by tricking the model into 
selecting the least-likely class of a prediction to be its final result. The argument behind this attack 
was to create a more interesting attack where the adversarial sample was able to trigger a completely 




𝑥𝑥0𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑥𝑥, 
𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛+1𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥,𝜖𝜖{𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝛼𝛼 𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺( 𝛻𝛻𝑥𝑥   𝐽𝐽(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿))} 
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺, 𝑥𝑥: 𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿: 𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦 𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎:𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺 
𝛼𝛼: 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝐺𝐺 




DeepFool is a method to generate minimal perturbations which is sufficient to mislead the model 
using iterative linearization approach [13]. Starting with binary classification problem with affine 
classifiers: 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑤𝑤𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 + 𝑙𝑙, the authors assumed that neural networks are linear in nature and each 
class is separated by a hyperplane from another. Also, to take in account the non-linearity of neural 
networks, the approach performs the same steps in iterative manner until an adversary is created. 
They proved that it is possible to create an adversarial example by using L2 norm in an iterative 
manner until the 𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺�𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)� ≠ 𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺(𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥 + 𝑒𝑒)) where r is the minimum perturbation required. They 
extended the algorithm to multi class classification and claimed that this approach works with L∞ 
norm as well. DeepFool was able to create adversarial samples by using smaller perturbations, 
compared to [9], the average perturbations were five times less. DeepFool is considered as one the 
more sophisticated attacks and readers can refer to the original work for in depth knowledge [13]. 
3.5 Carlini & Wagner L2 Attack (CWL2) 
 
Carlini & Wagner proposed an attack that was built on the same idea of solving the optimization 
problem of incorrect prediction objective and minimal distance term [4]. After [13], published their 
work, where they claimed that defensive distillation increased the robustness of deep learning models 




Wagner, challenged the claim by introducing new attack methodology which was successful against 
both un-distilled and distilled models. In their approach, logits-based loss function was used instead 
of the softmax cross entropy loss and the target variable was transposed to the argtanh space which 
helped in solving the problem using modern solvers such as Adam.  The approach also used binary 
search techniques to find the optimal coefficient which balanced the trade-off between prediction and 
the distance measure. Using the CWL2 attack, they were able to construct more successful adversarial 
examples with smaller perturbations. 
3.6 Carlini & Wagner L infinity Attack (CWL∞) 
 
CWL∞ attack follows the same concept of CWL2 but uses an L∞ distance measure instead of L2 
distance. CWL∞ attack is more difficult to optimize when compared to L2 attack since it penalizes 
only the maximum term. To address the problem, Carlini & Wagner replaced the L2 term in the 
objective function with a penalty value which started with 1 but decreased monotonically in each 
iteration of the algorithm [4].  
Finally, L∞ attack is an iterative algorithm which only penalizes the largest perturbation value and 




CHAPTER 4. DEFENDING THE MODELS 
 
4.1 Challenges of Securing Deep Learning Models 
The existence of adversarial examples that can trick a deep learning model model into performing 
poorly is an intriguing concept. It is an open topic of research which is of interest for both attackers 
and researchers who intend to make resilient deep learning models. But, due to the intrinsic nature of 
deep neural networks, it has not yet been conclusively proven why such samples exist. And, no 
universal detection or defense mechanism exists that can protect models from any attack. Based on 
these facts, there are few challenges pertaining to the adversarial examples that currently restrict the 
researcher community to make better attacks or defense mechanisms. In this section, the authors 
discuss few of the factors which offer challenges towards defending against adversarial examples. 
In 2014, it was found that adversarial examples created from one dataset were able to attack the 
same deep neural network trained using a different dataset [18]. This was an interesting observation 
because it hints at the transferable nature of the adversarial examples attack. Later [15], experimented 
with adversarial examples that were constructed using one deep neural network architecture to attack 
a different neural network architecture. The results confirmed the transferability property of the 
adversarial examples. It also empowered the attackers to attack systems with limited or no knowledge 
using adversarial examples trained on a different model, [11], further explored this characteristic of 
adversarial examples and proposed that non-targeted attacks are more transferable compared to the 
targeted attacks. 
The question of why adversarial examples exist is an open topic of research. One possible 
explanation is that exhaustively covering all possible test cases and corner cases would make models 
extremely complex. As a result, most models cover only high probability test cases ignoring these 





Figure 3: Adversarial retraining process 
For linear models that take inputs with high dimensions, the chances of creating adversarial 
examples become infinitesimal. Even slight changes to the input can result in adversarial examples 
that the model had not seen before. Reference [6], pointed out that this issue is not limited to just 
neural networks but other linear models as well. 
No universal method exists to defend against adversarial attacks; all attacks and defense are 
application specific and most of them are based on some specific characteristic of neural networks. 
Though there is some research that claims to provide universal security, but they have failed, given a 
small change in attack strategy [3]. Hence as of today, it is not possible to have a 100% secure deep 
neural network which can resist any adversarial example attack. 
Though there is no conclusive explanation for the existence of adversarial examples till now, 
linearity within model architecture is suspected to be one of the reasons [6]. The high dimensionality 
of the problem adds to the complexity and even a slight perturbation in the input space can possibly 
result in an adversary. Theoretically, it is possible to prepare all possible adversaries from input space 
and then use it to train a robust model which will be immune to adversarial attacks [17]. But such an 





Figure 4: Ensemble adversarial retraining prediction process 
 
4.2 Adversarial Retraining 
 
Adversarial retraining is one of the defense techniques against adversarial examples which uses 
the adversarial examples for retraining with the objective of building more robust models [6, 7, 10]. 
Most of the previous work focuses on using FGSM adversaries for adversarial retraining and have 
shown some promising results on MNIST dataset [12]. But, the problem with such adversaries is that 
it does not perform well against other types of attacks such as BIM. I extended the same idea of 
adversarial retraining using adversaries from six different attack models and found out that the 
problem is not restricted to models retrained with FGSM adversaries. All the six different retrained 
models did not perform well against one or more of the adversaries. 
 
4.3 Proposed Solution 
 
To create a strong defense strategy, I choose to implement six different gradient-based attack 
algorithms which included more sophisticated attacks such as ILLC, BIM, DeepFool and Carlini-
Wagner attacks along with FGSM. Six different models were retrained using the same pre-trained 




constructed from each input batch of clean images and were appended to the input batch which 
doubled the batch size for each iteration. Hence while retraining each batch contained clean images 
and their adversarial counterpart. The target model was used for retraining with no transformation in 
its architecture and with categorical cross entropy loss function. The above described process flow of 
adversarial retraining is presented in Figure 3. 
Each of six retrained models either maintained or improved upon their prediction accuracy of 
clean images. Upon analysis of the model performance on other adversaries, it was observed that the 
model trained with FGSM was able to defend against adversaries generated by the ILLC method with 
an accuracy of 86%. The model retrained with BIM adversaries was able to defend the model against 
FGSM and ILLC adversaries even more than it could from itself. Similar trends were observed with 
respect to DeepFool and Carlini-Wagner adversaries. These experiments proved that models retrained 
using one of the adversaries cannot defend against all but some of the other kind of attacks. 
Any single retrained model is not enough to provide substantial defense against all the six 
adversaries. By using an ensemble of these models, I could achieve better accuracy while 
encountering adversarial examples attack. The ensemble adversarial defense technique uses four out 
of the six retrained models to construct a highly robust defense architecture which can withstand even 
Carlini-Wagner attack with a minimum accuracy of 89.31%. To generate the final prediction from the 
ensemble of models, I sum up the class-wise individual predicted scores from each model. As 
depicted in Figure 4, from this final predicted score I select the argmax of the vector to obtain the 
final prediction category. This strategy is better than hard majority voting technique since it exploits 





CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 
The set of experiments for this work includes the implementation of FGSM, BIM, ILLC, 
DeepFool, Carlini-Wagner L2 and L∞ attacks on ResNet34 model using cifar10 dataset. The attack 
effectiveness of these adversaries is analyzed to understand their relative strengths and weaknesses. 
The objective is to use these adversaries for defending the target model, such that the defense is 
transferable to other kinds of attacks as well. 
5.1 Experiment Setting 
For this experiment, I selected the ResNet model with 34 layers as our target model [8]. The 
cifar10 dataset was selected because of its size and specification which allowed us to execute such 
large set of experiments. To implement the attacks and ensemble defense, I used PyTorch framework 
in python3 and used a computer with the following specifications: Intel i7 processor, 16 GB RAM 
and 6 GB GPU (GTX 1060). For attack, the model architecture shown in Figure 2 was used to 
generate adversaries using the target model.  
 






Figure 6: ResNet model with 34 residual blocks 
 
5.2 Implementation Details 
This project has been structured in two parts: the first part involves creating adversaries using six 
adversary generation algorithm and the second part consists of defending the target model from these 
adversaries. For creating adversaries to evaluate the six types of attacks in first part of the project, I 
have used the 10000 images from test set of the cifar10 dataset. 
The value of epsilon for FGSM attack was set to 0.1, which ensured that the perturbations added to 
the original image was in the range of [0,0.1]. Similarly, the starting epsilon value for BIM and ILLC 
attack was set to 0.001 and the number of maximum perturbations were set to 10. For Deep Fool, 
CWL2 and CWL∞ attacks number of maximum permissible iterations was set to 10 as well. The loss 
function in case of DeepFool was categorical cross entropy and for Carlini-Wagner L2 and L∞ 
attacks it was argtanh. 
In part two of the project, the adversarial retraining strategy used the pre-trained weights of the 
target model that was trained on clean data. The dataset for retraining was prepared by generating 
adversarial samples from clean train dataset (50000 images) using the six algorithms from part one 




consisting of clean samples and their adversarial counterparts. The model was then retrained using a 
batch size of 64 and 10 epochs. Loss function was categorical cross entropy and the optimizer used 
was adadelta. Using the above setup six different retrained models was retrained using the six 
adversarial algorithms. These six retrained models were used for subsequent experiments pertaining 
to ensemble strategy. The implementation of the all the attacks and the defense strategy can be found 
at the following link: https://github.com/mani-nm/Adversarial_Examples 
 
5.3 Adversarial Attacks 
The selected set of adversarial attack algorithms were implemented using the target model: ResNet 
with 34 layers which had a base accuracy of 93.7% on the test set of clean images. The standard set 
of 10000 test images from cifar10 was used to create adversaries for the experiment. The results of 
adversarial examples attack on model accuracies is shown in Figure 5. Target model’s base accuracy 
is plotted with label “No Attack” and its accuracy under different attacks are plotted thereafter. 
Among the attacks, FGSM was least lethal with model accuracy maintaining at 67.28% which was 
followed by ILLC at 62.57% which uses a similar attack signature. Among the stronger attacks: 
model accuracy dropped to 18.32% for BIM and CWL2 was most effective attack where the model 






Figure 7: Model accuracy under adversarial examples attack 
 
5.4 Adversarial Retraining: One Model Defense 
Adversarial retraining was done on the train set of 50000 images from cifar10 using the 
architecture shown in Figure 3. The pre-trained target model was used for retraining and a static copy 
of the same model was decoupled and used for producing adversaries as part of the retraining 
architecture. Base batch size of 64 was used for adversary generation and the generated adversaries 
were appended to the batch for retraining. Six models were obtained from retraining exercise and 
their individual effectiveness is presented in Table I, where the bold values highlight the best 
accuracy for each attack. Each of the retrained models is  





























Attack Base Accuracy FGSM BIM ILLC DeepFool CWL2 CWLinf
No Attack 93.7 94.34 93.73 94.44 80.36 93.14 92.75
FGSM 67.28 85.43 86.95 85.94 81.84 86.76 86.74
BIM 18.32 68.29 72.61 68.94 75.32 74.26 72.79
ILLC 62.56 86.06 88.09 85.69 83.07 88.46 87.76
DeepFool 10.14 4.59 4.46 5.24 24.22 4.3 4.09
CWL2 2.04 20.69 29.25 22.08 56.29 31.65 31.88
CWL inf 6.86 50.33 58.12 50.82 66.56 60.63 59.81







Figure 8: Comparative analysis of single model adversarial retraining defense 
evaluated against all six types of adversaries, to test their robustness. Model retrained with FGSM 
adversaries improves the base accuracy of the target model when tested on clean images. In general, 
FGSM, BIM and ILLC can be defended fairly against adversaries by using any of retrained model. 
There is some improvement in retrained model accuracy in case of DeepFool and Carlini-Wagner 
attacks as compared to their respective attack effectiveness on the undefended model. But, the 
improvement is not enough to allow the model to be used confidently in a real-world scenario. 
5.5 Adversarial Retraining: Ensemble Defense 
For our next experiment, I created an ensemble of all the retrained models which were used for 
predicting instead of a single model. The predicted softmax score from each retrained model was 
summed up and then used for calculating the argmax to finalize the predicted class. The ensemble of 
six models was able to withstand the adversarial attack from all six attacks with substantial 
























model ensemble defense are shown in Figure 6. It gives a better result compared to any single model-
based prediction used in adversarial retraining experiment. Even complicated attacks like Carlini-
Wagner L∞ could be successfully resisted with an accuracy of 88.2% and ILLC was most confidently 
defended with an accuracy of 95.91%. 
The increased accuracy from the ensemble method comes at the price of performance where the 
prediction time of six model ensemble is 5.6 times that of the single model prediction time. Given 
most of the models are used in real-time systems, limiting prediction latency is also one of the key 
factors. Keeping this in mind, the final set of experiments explored the idea of creating an ensemble 
of the retrained model that are capable of thwarting an adversarial attack and at the same time do not 
sacrifice a lot of prediction performance. 
I experimented with different combinations of model ensembles and realized that an ensemble of four 
models out of six gave the best performance and accuracy tradeoff. To identify the ideal set of four 
models, I experimented with different combinations of retrained models. Groups were created based 
on the following criteria: nature of attack, attack strength and adversarial retrained model’s accuracy. 
FGSM and ILLC demonstrated similar levels of attack strength and their respective adversarial 






Figure 9: Ensemble Adversarial retraining defense results 
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Figure 11: Box-plot of variation of four-model ensemble defense under each attack type 
Hence, I pick only one of these two in the ensemble and never both. The challenge with adversarial 
defense was to identify the right combination of other retrained model which could defend against 
sophisticated attacks like BIM, DeepFool, CWL2 and CWL∞ attacks. The results of the experiment 
are shown in Figure 7, using which I can recommend that an ensemble of FGSM, BIM, CWL2 and 
CWL∞ gives the most balanced prediction accuracies against all six kinds of attacks. The spread of 
ensemble prediction accuracy for each kind of attack can be analyzed using the box plots in Figure8. 
FGSM, ILLC and DeepFool attacks are defended with consistency using all the four model 
ensembles, whereas CWL∞ and BIM do show some spread and appears to perform better with an 
ensemble of sophisticated models. 
Another interesting observation from this experiment is that all the subsets of the ensembles provide 
comparable defense against all adversaries when compared to six model ensemble and are 33% faster 
compared to it, as presented in Table II. Using a different set of four models for ensemble in different 





Table II: Defense model prediction time 
 
The results of the experiment show that the ensemble of these four models can be effectively used 
to defend against all six of the adversaries. The DeepFool attack which was immune to all single 
defense approach can be defended with an accuracy of 96.24% and CWL2 attack could be defended 
with a confidence of 91.2%. Similarly, BIM and CWL∞ attacks can be successfully defended against 
with an accuracy of 93.23% and 91.5% respectively. Hence, the ensemble approach can defend the 
target model with more confidence against most types of gradient-based adversaries.  
Model Prediction Time/Image (sec)
One Model 0.001332
4 Model Ensemble 0.005055




CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Deep Learning has facilitated the application of artificial intelligence in security critical 
applications by creating highly accurate and precise models. Its vulnerability to adversarial examples, 
however, has raised serious concerns regarding its full-fledged adoption. In this report, I have 
discussed the vulnerabilities of deep learning models with respect to adversarial example attacks. 
Even though some research has been conducted to construct adversarial examples and to defend deep 
learning models against them, the core idea behind the existence of adversarial examples is still 
elusive to the research community. Most of the proposed attacks work on a specific model 
configuration and countermeasures for these are prepared to protect against the corresponding 
attacks. Carlini & Wagner showcased that the recent existing defense strategies are rigid in structure 
and can be defeated by using a new loss function in existing attack strategies. Hence, as of now, no 
universal defense strategy exists for different kinds of adversarial example attacks. 
After researching upon the subject, some observations may be derived to guide the future research 
direction. Firstly, most researchers have chosen to show their work on the MNIST dataset, which is a 
considerably small and basic dataset. Next, quantifying the robustness of defense must be done 
against a significant number of attacks which should include both basic and sophisticated attacks. In 
addition, there exists a need for a standard platform where different attacks can be performed and 
evaluated on a large scale. 
Adversarial examples pose a serious threat to the real-time deployment of deep learning image 
recognition models. The impact of these attacks can be severe and securing these models against such 
attacks is of paramount importance. In this work, I selected a set of six strong attacks and 
demonstrated their effectiveness against state of the art ResNet model. Experimentation with strong 
attacks is the only way to ensure that strong defense techniques can be explored. I demonstrated that 




proposed a new ensemble method which used four different adversarial retrained model to perform 
model predictions. Results of my experiments show the strengths of the ensemble defense and prove 
that by using a subset of adversaries, a target model can be defended from some of the unseen 
attacks.  
In my project, I researched and experimented in depth about gradient-based adversaries and for 
future experimentation attacks other than gradient-based attacks can be explored. Evaluation of my 
ensemble defense strategy could be evaluated against new types of attacks. Adversarial retraining is 
one of proactive approaches for defending deep learning models, similar proactive strategies can be 
researched upon which can increase model’s robustness against such attacks.  
Another interesting future work could be to compare the retrained robust models and the original 
target model to understand the effects the retraining upon the internal weights of the network. 
Analyzing the differences between the two network weights can shed some light upon the different 
layers and neurons which adds to the robustness of the retrained network and eventually provides 
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